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SHARP V. STATE: DESPITE NOT FORMALLY OBJECTING, 
DEFENSE COUNSEL PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUE 
OF WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT INAPPROPRIATELY 
WEIGHED DEFENDANT’S DECISION NOT TO PLEAD 
GUILTY AT SENTENCING; THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT 
IMPERMISSIBLY CONSIDER DEFENDANT’S REJECTION 
OF THE PLEA OFFER AT SENTENCING. 
 
By: Colin Campbell 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that defense counsel’s statements 
conveyed an objection to the circuit court’s perceived consideration of the 
defendant’s decision not to plead guilty at sentencing.  Sharp v. State, 446 
Md. 669, 113 A.3d 1089 (2016).  As a result, the court held that defense 
counsel sufficiently preserved the issue for appellate review.  Id. at 684, 113 
A.3d at 1098.  Ultimately, though, the circuit court’s statements at sentencing 
did not give rise to the inference of an impermissible consideration.  Id. at 
701, 113 A.3d at 1108. 
     On March 17, 2003, Raymond Evianiak (“Evianiak”), Justin Sharp 
(“Sharp”), and others were drinking at a party.  While intoxicated, Evianiak 
insulted Sharp, leading to an argument.  A few hours later Sharp proceeded 
to punch Evianiak and beat him with a bottle, in response to the earlier insult.  
At no point did Evianiak defend himself or retaliate against Sharp.  Sharp 
was charged with attempted first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree 
assault, and openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent 
to injure. 
     On April 30, 2014, Sharp appeared in court for trial where he was advised 
of the maximum penalties he faced if convicted.  The State offered a plea of 
first-degree assault and recommended a twenty-five year sentence, with all 
but ten years suspended.  The court counter-offered a twenty-year sentence, 
with all but eight years suspended.  Sharp declined both offers, pled not 
guilty, and elected a jury trial, at which point the court withdrew its plea 
offer. 
     At trial, witnesses testified that Sharp severely beat a drunk and semi-
conscious Evianiak with a bottle, splattering blood on the ceiling and walls.  
Following the trial, the jury found Sharp guilty of first-degree and second-
degree assault, and openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with 
the intent to injure. 
     At the sentencing hearing, the State requested a prison sentence exceeding 
the guidelines due to the extent of the injuries sustained by Evianiak and his 
lack of consciousness while Sharp continued to beat him.  Sharp argued for 
incarceration not exceeding eight years, since that was the court’s offer prior 
to Sharp electing a jury trial.  Sharp commented that the court would have 
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heard the same facts as they did at trial; therefore, post-trial sentencing 
should reflect the same punishment as previously offered.  The court 
disagreed; stating that there is a difference due to the trauma placed on 
victims and witnesses at trial that would not result had the defendant 
accepted the plea.  Consequently, the circuit court deviated from the 
sentencing guidelines, imposing a stricter punishment to reflect the brutality 
of beating an unconscious victim.  Sharp was sentenced to twenty-five years 
for the first-degree assault, and a concurrent three years for wearing and 
carrying a dangerous weapon. 
     Sharp appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, claiming 
that the circuit court impermissibly considered his decision not to plead 
guilty at sentencing.  In an unreported opinion, the court of special appeals 
held that Sharp failed to preserve the issue for appellate review and affirmed 
his conviction.  The court also held that the circuit court’s statements at 
sentencing did not show that it was influenced by Sharp’s decision not to 
accept the plea.  Sharp petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by reviewing the 
colloquy at the sentencing hearing to determine if the issue was properly 
preserved for review.  Sharp, 446 Md. at 682, 113 A.3d at 1096.  Maryland 
Rule 8-131(a) requires a defendant object in order to preserve for appellate 
review an issue as to the trial court’s impermissible considerations at 
sentencing.  Id. at 683, 113 A.3d at 1097.  At the sentencing hearing, Sharp 
never formally objected to the circuit court allegedly penalizing Sharp by 
impermissibly considering that both plea offers were rejected.  Id. at 683-84, 
113 A.3d at 1097.  However, the court of appeals found that Sharp’s 
statement, “I don't believe in punishing someone for wanting to go to trial,” 
was sufficient to put the circuit court on notice to his objection.  Id. at 683-
84, 113 A.3d at 1097.   
     Furthermore, while Sharp acknowledged some of the circuit court’s 
statements during sentencing, the court concluded that these 
acknowledgements did not amount to an acceptance that the court could 
punish him for exercising his constitutional right to go to trial.  Id. at 684, 
113 A.3d at 1098.  In other words, the court concluded that Sharp’s 
statements did not amount to a withdrawal of his objection.  Id.  As such, the 
court of appeals held that Sharp’s counsel properly preserved the issue for 
review despite not formally objecting.  Id. 
     Next, the court addressed Sharp’s contention that the circuit court erred in 
impermissibly considering his decision not to plead guilty at sentencing.  
Sharp, 446 Md. at 685, 113 A.3d at 1098.  Pursuant to Maryland’s 
Declaration of Rights and the United States Constitution, a court may not 
consider an individual’s decision to reject a plea offer at sentencing.  Id.  
(citing Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 537, 542-43, 543 n.5 (1975)).  In 
order to properly determine if the circuit court impermissibly considered 
Sharp’s decision, the court examined “the context of the entire sentencing 
proceeding.”  Sharp, 446 Md. at 689, 113 A.3d at 1101. 
74 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 47.1 
 
     The court then assessed the circuit court's statements at sentencing as a 
whole to determine whether a reasonable person would conclude that the 
circuit court may “have been motivated by an impermissible consideration.”  
Sharp, 446 Md. at 689, 113 A.3d at 1101 (quoting Abdul-Maleek v. State, 
426 Md. 59, 73-74, 43 A.3d 383, 391 (2012)).  The court observed that the 
circuit court’s statements at sentencing were in response to Sharp’s argument 
that nothing had changed between the plea offer and post-trial.  Sharp, 446 
Md. at 692, 113 A.3d at 1102-03.  Since the circuit court was merely 
responding to this argument, the court found that there was no indication that 
Sharp’s rejection of the plea was considered in sentencing.  Id. at 691-92, 
113 A.3d at 1102-03. 
     Next, the court noted the circuit court’s rationale for the increased 
sentence included a number of permissible factors. Sharp, 446 Md. at 692, 
113 A.3d at 1103.  Some of the factors considered were the brutality of the 
beating and the lack of redeeming qualities during Sharp’s allocution and 
mitigation.  Id. at 693, 113 A.3d at 1104.  Lastly, the court reiterated that the 
circuit court’s plea offer was not taken into consideration to determine 
Sharp’s sentence.  Id. at 694, 113 A.3d at 1104. 
     Following this analysis, the court addressed the issue of the propriety of 
the circuit “court’s offer.”  Sharp, 446 Md. at 694-95, 113 A.3d at 1104.  The 
court emphasized that Maryland Rule 4-243 does not confer plea bargaining 
power to trial courts.  Id. at 697, 113 A.3d at 1105.  Furthermore, the 
American Bar Association Standard 14-3.3 states that judges should not 
participate in plea offer negotiations.  Id. at 699-700, 113 A.3d at 1106-07.  
In light of these standards and prior precedent, the court concluded that a 
prosecutor, not a court, may make plea offers.  Sharp, 446 Md. at 700, 113 
A.3d at 1107.  While the court offer was improper, its rejection was not 
considered at sentencing, and thus did not warrant reversal of the sentence.  
Id. at 701, 113 A.3d at 1108. 
     In Sharp, the court held that counsel can preserve an issue for appellate 
review without formally objecting so long as the statement made properly 
informs the court that counsel is taking issue with their action.  Furthermore, 
a defendant presented with a plea offer cannot rely on the availability of that 
sentence during post-trial sentencing.  Sharp also reiterates the criticisms of 
court plea offers.  Despite the court’s best intentions, prosecutors should be 
cognizant that court offers may result in the negation of a sentence, thereby 
creating additional work for trial courts and not effectuating judicial 
economy. 
